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ABSTRACT
Only a small fraction of law enforcement agencies in the
United States obtain a warrant before tracking the cell phones of
suspects and persons of interest. This is due, in part, to the fact
that courts have struggled to keep pace with a changing
technological landscape. Indeed, courts around the country have
issued a disparate array of holdings on the issue of warrantless cell
phone tracking. This lack of judicial uniformity has led to
confusion for both law enforcement agencies and the public alike.
In order to protect reasonable expectations of privacy in the
twenty-first century, Congress should pass legislation requiring
law-enforcement agencies to obtain a warrant based upon
probable cause before they can track a cell phone except in a
limited set of time-sensitive situations and emergencies.
This Issue Brief describes the technology police use to track
cell phones, discusses the need for federal legislation, concludes
that current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is inadequate to
address cell phone tracking, analyzes two bills dealing with
“geolocation information” privacy that legislators have introduced
in Congress, and ultimately concludes that one of those bills is
superior to the other.

INTRODUCTION
Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population,
crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart.
Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons
in the arsenal of every arbitrary government.
—JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON1

Almost ninety percent of American adults own a cell phone.2 Such
pervasive cell-phone use has revolutionized the way Americans conduct
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their lives.3 In response to this trend, law-enforcement agencies have
changed the ways they fight crime.4 In 2011, law-enforcement agencies
sent nine popular cellular-service providers over 1.3 million requests for
customer cellular data.5 Because their use is so prevalent,6 cell phones
serve as convenient tools for tracking suspects and persons of interest.7 Due
to the absence of comprehensive federal legislation, law-enforcement
agencies apply a wide variety of different legal standards to determine the
propriety of tracking cell phones.8 Unfortunately, most agencies do not
obtain a warrant before they begin monitoring a suspect’s cell phone. 9 In
fact, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) reports that of over 200
law-enforcement agencies surveyed nationwide, only a “tiny handful”
actually acquire a warrant before tracking.10 In order to protect reasonable
expectations of privacy in the twenty-first century, Congress should pass
legislation requiring law-enforcement agencies to obtain a warrant based
upon probable cause before they can track a cell phone except in a limited
set of time-sensitive situations and emergencies.
Warrantless cell-phone tracking presents a great challenge to Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Courts have churned out a disparate array of
holdings on the issue.11 The lack of judicial uniformity has created
confusion for law-enforcement agencies and consumers. Consequently,
both groups need comprehensive federal legislation to tackle the privacy
challenges presented by warrantless cell-phone tracking. As Justice Alito
wrote in United States v. Jones, “[i]n circumstances involving dramatic
2
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technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be
legislative.”12 Courts are ill-equipped to keep pace with rapid changes in
cell-phone technology and the shifting expectations of privacy that
accompany them. Conversely, “[a] legislative body is well situated to
gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance
privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.”13
First, this Issue Brief discusses the cellular location technology that
police use to monitor citizens who use cell phones. Specifically, this
commentary will examine cell site, GPS, and WiFi technology. Second,
this Issue Brief will show that legislation is needed in this area because cellphone tracking is a widespread practice that may eventually replace
federally regulated wiretapping to some degree. Third, this Issue Brief will
dissect United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court’s landmark GPS case, and
explain why the decision is not helpful to lower courts confronted with cellphone privacy issues. Fourth, this Issue Brief will explain how current
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is problematic when it comes to
protecting peoples’ expectations of privacy in cellular location data. In
particular, this Issue Brief will address the inadequacies of the “third-party
doctrine”—the idea that people forfeit their expectations of privacy when
they share information with or allow their information to be seen by
others.14 Finally, this Issue Brief will evaluate two bills dealing with
“geolocation information” privacy that legislators have introduced in the
U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate. The article concludes
that one bill is far more effective in protecting cellular privacy interests than
the other.

I. THE TECHNOLOGY
Police can track cell phones using a variety of methods. One
method is by obtaining cell-site information.15 Cell-site information refers
to the location data that a cellular-service provider or even a third party can
gather when a cell-phone user makes or receives a call.16 Another method
police use is gathering data from the GPS (global positioning satellite)

12
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technology embedded in “smartphones.”17 Modern smartphones equipped
with GPS technology can be located nearly anywhere.18 Furthermore, many
cell phones contain tracking chips that allow service providers to locate
subscribers—even when the phones are not in use.19
Traditional cell-site tracking is possible because service providers maintain
a network of towers that send and receive signals from cell phones.20 Those
companies collect and maintain records so they can identify which towers
provided a cell phone with service at the beginning and end of every phone
call.21 The recorded information also identifies the date and time of a call,
the number of the cell phone used, and indicates whether the call was
incoming or outgoing.22 Using this data, the government can determine a
user’s general location at the time of a call.23 The actual location
information is not precise because the government can only tell which cellphone tower was closest to the user.24 Furthermore, since the distance
between cell-phone towers varies, so does the degree of accuracy in locating
a user.25 Some companies have divided their towers’ service areas into 120degree sectors with each individual tower serving as a focal point. 26 This
method allows companies to locate individuals with greater precision, but
not with enough spatial specificity to determine whether someone is in a
particular building.27 However, the government is still able to use
information from multiple towers to triangulate the origin of a cell-phone
call.28
Law-enforcement agencies can obtain cell-site tracking information
from service providers in two ways.29 First, agencies can ask a provider for
“historical” cell-site data, which is information about a user’s past locations
17
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collected over a particular time period.30 The amount of historical data
available to police is potentially enormous, since providers keep extensive
records of customers’ past locations.31 The U.S. Department of Justice
reports that Verizon keeps records of its customers’ past locations for one
year and AT&T keeps records dating back to July 2008.32 However, neither
Verizon nor AT&T discloses these facts in their privacy policies. Second,
agencies can ask for “prospective” data, information that a company
provides in real time.33 Regardless of whether the data is obtained post hoc
or in real time, the actual information is identical.34
Law-enforcement agencies can also obtain cell-site data directly by
using portable devices called StingRays.35 StingRays mimic cell-phone
towers and trick cell phones into sending them information like text
messages and cell-site locations.36 They can gather information from any
cell phone in the area.37 Because StingRays have the potential to collect
information from many nearby cell phones, the Electronic Frontier
Foundation has called the practice an “unconstitutional, all you can eat data
buffet.”38 The U.S. Department of Justice, however, argues that lawenforcement agencies may use StingRay without a warrant when the
“device is not capturing the contents of a particular dialogue call . . . .”39
Police can also track many modern smartphones through GPS
technology.40 The U.S. Department of Defense maintains the GPS system
using twenty-four satellites that orbit the Earth.41 The government allows
civilian manufacturers, including cell phone producers, to use the system.42
30
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Every device that uses GPS technology is embedded with an individualized
computer chip that can pinpoint a user’s location anywhere on Earth.43 GPS
satellites are able to determine a smartphone’s location to within
approximately ten meters.44 Disrupting the ability of GPS satellites to
locate devices carrying this technology is against federal law.45 However,
many smartphones allow users to disable the GPS tracking feature.46
Some phones even have tracking chips that store a variety of information
that can potentially offer law enforcement a comprehensive sketch of a cellphone user’s movements throughout the day.47 For instance, certain
versions of Apple’s iPhone collect “geographic data” every time users turn
on the Location Services option in their phones’ settings or when they use a
GPS application.48 The device will save information about nearby cellphone towers and WiFi hotspots, assign the data a random identification
number, and transmit it to Apple every twelve hours (or whenever Internet
access next become available).49 Using any one of these methods, lawenforcement agencies can determine a user’s location easily and cheaply.

II. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION
Cell-phone use in the United States is ubiquitous.50 As of April
2012, a total of 88 percent of American adults owned a cell phone.51 By
December 2012, there were approximately 326,400,000 wireless subscriber
connections in the country.52 This means that there are at least ten million
more wireless connections than people in the U.S. today.53 Additionally, in
35.8 percent of American households, cell phones have replaced traditional
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home phones completely.54 Cell phones have become a principal feature of
contemporary American life.
With the rise of multifunctional smartphones, such as iPhones and
BlackBerry devices, cell phones have become even more important. They
operate not only as telephones but also as personal digital organizers,
cameras, email readers, music players, etc.55 As one technology expert put
it, “[w]e now carry our phones with us wherever we go, and we expect them
to have service wherever we happen to be.”56
As Americans increasingly rely on their cell phones, police
continually devote more attention to tracking mobile devices in order to
monitor suspects and persons of interest.57 Data suggests that police are, to
some extent, replacing traditional wiretaps with cell-phone tracking.58 In
2011, the number of warrants issued for wiretaps decreased 14 percent
while nine cell-phone service providers responded to 1.3 million police
demands for user information.59 In fact, in order to handle the massive
volume of requests, most service providers pay teams of lawyers, data
technicians, and other professionals to review requests and provide data to
police twenty-four hours a day.60
Obtaining tracking information is less expensive and less timeconsuming for law enforcement than securing a warrant to wiretap a
suspect’s phone.61 A shift away from wiretaps is troublesome because
police can increasingly evade the privacy protections of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), a comprehensive statute that places
limitations on police wiretapping as well as electronic and aural
eavesdropping.62 Significantly, the interceptions prohibited by ECPA are
those that capture a communication’s “content,” in other words,
“information concerning [its] substance, purport, or meaning.”63 Since
cellular location data does not include content, the statute does not regulate
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its interception, use, or disclosure.64 Instead, the widespread police practice
of obtaining cellular location information from providers is left in the hands
of the courts.65 Judges, limited to deciding particular cases with particular
facts, are simply unable to fashion broad, detailed regulatory schemes like
ECPA.66 The practice should be regulated alonh the same lines as
wiretapping in order to protect modern privacy expectations. Any judicial
substitute would fall short of that goal.

III. UNITED STATES V. JONES OFFERS LITTLE GUIDANCE
The Supreme Court opinion in United States v. Jones does not offer
direct guidance to lower courts on the question of government cellular
geolocation data surveillance.67 In Jones, Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, held that the government’s warrantless physical occupation of
someone’s property qualifies as a per se “search” under the Fourth
Amendment.68 In that case, the government attached a GPS tracking device
underneath the defendant’s car and monitored his movements on public
roadways for twenty-eight days—all without a search warrant.69 Justice
Scalia concluded that this kind of common-law trespass would constitute a
violation of the Fourth Amendment as it was understood at the time of the
Amendment’s ratification and was therefore not acceptable without a
warrant.70
The holding in Jones does not repudiate the “reasonable expectation
of privacy” test developed in Katz v. United States, but rather complements
it.71 In fact, Justice Sotomayor and Justice Alito both wrote concurring
opinions in Jones that embraced the application of the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” test from Katz.72 In Katz, the Court held that the
Fourth Amendment protects “people, not places” and the government’s
placement of a listening device on the outside of a public telephone booth
qualified as a Fourth Amendment “search.”73 The “reasonable expectation
64

See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8); 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8).
66
See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 875 (2004).
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See generally United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). Similarly, in Riley v.
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), the Supreme Court issued a 9-0 decision
mandating strong Fourth Amendment protection for substantive data on cell phones
such as photographs and videos. While important, that decision does not provide
direct guidance on the issue of cell phone tracking either.
68
Id. at 949.
69
Id. at 948–49.
70
Id. at 949.
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Id. at 953.
72
Id. at 954–55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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of privacy” test applied in subsequent cases derives from Justice Harlan’s
famous concurrence, in which he maintained that the Fourth Amendment
has a “twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy, and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”74 Since Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion did not supplant this test, the government’s
obtainment of cellular location data from a service provider would fall
under the Katz test.75 Indeed, as Justice Scalia explicitly stated,
“[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without
trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”76 And as Justice
Sotomayor remarked in her concurrence, “[i]n cases of electronic or other
novel modes of surveillance that do not depend upon a physical invasion on
property, the majority’s . . . trespassory test may provide little guidance.”77
While Justice Sotomayor endorsed both the majority rule and the
Katz test,78 Justice Alito rejected Justice Scalia’s property-based rule.79
Instead, Justice Alito would have held for the defendant using a strict Katz
analysis.80 Without providing much explanation, he stated simply that “the
use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses
impinges on expectations of privacy,” and “[w]e need not identify with
precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a search, for
the line was surely crossed before the 4-week mark.”81 Justice Scalia
rightfully criticized this conclusion for raising two important unanswered
questions.82 First, if extended GPS tracking would impinge on reasonable
expectations of privacy only for “most offenses,” what kind of offenses
would legitimize such an investigation?83 And, second, why is four weeks
“surely” too long?84 The answers to these thorny questions should be
determined by a legislative body that, as Justice Alito wrote, is “well
situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to
balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.”85
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IV. THE INADEQUACY OF THE CURRENT DOCTRINE
Since Jones does not address the problem, lower courts must turn to
general Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in order to determine the
boundaries of society’s reasonable privacy expectations for cellular location
data. Unfortunately, courts face a major doctrinal obstacle in aligning
Fourth Amendment protections with modern societal norms in the “thirdparty doctrine”—the idea that when a person shares information with or
allows her information to be seen by others, she forfeits her expectations of
privacy in that information.86 While explicating this same basic principle,
the Supreme Court has articulated three different manifestations of this
doctrine throughout the years.87
The first manifestation, referred to as the “knowing exposure”
doctrine, was originally articulated in Katz when the Court wrote that
“[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”88 The Court
applied this doctrine in United States v. Knotts, when it held that a “[a]
person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another.”89 This idea was expanded in the three so-called “flyover cases,”
where the Court held that police could observe activities on private property
from an aircraft and not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment so long as they
stayed in the air.90
The second manifestation of the doctrine is referred to as the
“general use” idea.91 In one of the flyover cases, the Court held that a
Fourth Amendment “search” does not occur when the government uses
technology to survey private property as long as the gadget is “generally
available to the public.”92 Therefore, in Dow Chemical v. EPA, the
government did not conduct a “search” when it used a $22,000 mapmaking
camera mounted to an airplane to spy on private property because cameras
are readily available to the public.93

86

Making the Most of United States v. Jones, supra note 14, at 2.
Id. at 7 n.30.
88
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
89
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
90
Christopher Slobogin, Is the Fourth Amendment Relevant in a Technological
Age?, THE FUTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION 4 (Brookings Inst., Dec. 8, 2010),
available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/12
/08%204th%20amendment%20slobogin/1208_4th_amendment_slobogin.pdf (last
visited Oct. 25, 2014).
91
Id. at 5.
92
Dow Chem. Co. v. EPA, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986).
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The third and final manifestation of the doctrine is referred to as the
“assumption of the risk” principle.94 The two principal cases articulating
the assumption of the risk doctrine are Miller v. United States and Smith v.
Maryland.95 In Miller, the government had obtained copies of the
defendant’s checks and various records from two of his banks using
allegedly defective subpoenas but nonetheless successfully submitted them
into evidence during a criminal trial.96 The Court held that there was no
Fourth Amendment violation because a person “takes the risk, in revealing
his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person
to the Government . . . even if the information is revealed on the assumption
that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in
the third party will not be betrayed.”97 The Court went so far as to say that
even if the banks acted “solely as Government agents” in copying Miller’s
information and “complying without protest,” their deeds did not violate
anyone’s Fourth Amendment rights.98 Furthermore, the banks’ failure even
to notify Miller about their cooperation with law enforcement was not
problematic.99 In a footnote, the Court deemed this omission “neglect
without legal consequences . . . however unattractive it may be.”100
Dissenting in Miller, Justice Brennan quoted at length from
Burrows v. Superior Court, a California Supreme Court opinion about a
case with similar facts.101 In Burrows, a unanimous California Supreme
Court concluded that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in bank documents created within the ordinary course of business.102 The
court rejected the view that a depositor surrenders his Fourth Amendment
interests in his bank records just because a “detached and disinterested”
bank might voluntarily disclose their contents.103 The reason is because
giving financial information to a bank “is not entirely volitional, since it is
impossible to participate in the economic life of contemporary society
without maintaining a bank account.”104 The consequences of revoking
someone’s Fourth Amendment interests in his banking habits are
particularly pernicious because, “[i]n the course of such dealings, a
94

Slobogin, supra note 90, at 6.
Id.
96
Miller v. United States, 425 U.S. 435, 436–37 (1976).
97
Id. at 443.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 443 n.5.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 447–55 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Burrows v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590
(1974).
102
Miller, 425 U.S. at 448–49 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Burrows, 529 P.2d at
593).
103
Id. at 451.
104
Id.
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depositor reveals many aspects of his personal affairs, opinions, habits, and
associations. Indeed, the totality of bank records provides a virtual current
biography.”105 With keen foresight, the court went on to remark that the
“[d]evelopment of photocopying machines, electronic computers and other
sophisticated instruments have accelerated the ability of government to
intrude into areas which a person normally chooses to exclude from prying
eyes and inquisitive minds.”106 Therefore, courts interpreting constitutional
protections of privacy must “keep pace with the perils created by these new
devices.”107
However, the California Supreme Court’s warning did not prevent
the assumption-of-the-risk doctrine from solidifying. Three years after
Miller, the Supreme Court decided Smith using the same rule.108 In Smith,
the police had installed a device called a pen register at a telephone
company (with the company’s consent) to record any phone numbers the
defendant dialed from his house.109 Smith was convicted of robbery after
evidence at trial showed he had called a number which connected him to the
crime.110 Smith argued for the suppression of the evidence on Fourth
Amendment grounds,111 but the Court ultimately held that when a person
“voluntarily” dials a phone number, he “assume[s] the risk that the company
would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.”112
Assumption of the risk was what Justice Sotomayor was referring to
in Jones when she wrote, “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise
that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information
disclosed to third parties.”113 She elaborated:
This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a
great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the
course of carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone
numbers that they dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that
they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they correspond to their
Internet service providers; and the books, groceries, and medications
they purchase to online retailers. Perhaps, as Justice Alito notes, some
people may find the “tradeoff” of privacy for convenience
“worthwhile,” or come to accept this “diminution of privacy” as
“inevitable,” . . . and perhaps not. I for one doubt that people would
105
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Id. at 451.
107
Id.
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109
Id. at 737.
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accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government
of a list of every Web site they had visited in the last week, or month,
or year. But whatever the societal expectations, they can attain
constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy. I
would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some
member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone,
disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.114

The assumption-of-the-risk leg of the third-party doctrine is
particularly relevant to a discussion about tracking. Even if a person is
“voluntarily” transmitting electronic information to a cellular-service
provider, it does not necessarily follow that she is willing to have all of her
cellular location data arbitrarily (or even non-arbitrarily) handed over to the
police. Viewed in the aggregate and considering how frequently people
carry their phones with them outside their homes, cellular location data can
paint a vivid and revealing portrait of someone’s life. In order to keep those
details out of government hands, cellular location data should be kept
private.
One scholar refers to this concept as the “mosaic theory”—“the idea
that certain types of governmental investigation enable accumulation of so
many individual bits about a person’s life that the resulting personality
picture is worthy of constitutional protection.”115 Not only did Justice
Sotomayor express support for the idea,116 so did Justice Alito when he
wrote that “society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and
others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly
monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a
very long period.”117 Discussing a case about the warrantless installation of
a GPS device similar to that in Jones, the New York Court of Appeals put it
this way:
Disclosed in the data retrieved from the transmitting unit, nearly
instantaneously with the press of a button on the highly portable
receiving unit, will be trips the indisputably private nature of which
takes little imagination to conjure: trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic
surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club,
the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union
meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on.
What the technology yields and records with breathtaking quality and
quantity is a highly detailed profile, not simply of where we go, but by
easy inference, of our associations—political, religious, amicable and
114
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amorous, to name only a few—and of the pattern of our professional
and avocational pursuits.118

Whether the GPS data comes from a discreetly installed GPS device
or directly from someone’s phone makes no difference. The threat of
governmental intrusion into the private lives of citizens is the same.
Notably, the New York Court of Appeals decided its GPS case under the
New York State Constitution instead of federal law because so many federal
appellate courts had not yet weighed in on the issue.119 Unfortunately,
federal judicial theory has not yet caught up with today’s technological
landscape and society’s evolving expectations of privacy.120 And while not
insurmountable, the third-party doctrine could very likely stymie the efforts
of federal courts to revamp this area of law and lead to logically constrained
opinions as judges attempt to reconcile precedent with today’s brave new
world. Therefore, Congress, not the courts, should take the lead on this
issue by introducing legislation that would constrain the third-party doctrine
and establish robust privacy protections for cellular location data.

V. LEGISLATION
Legislation is needed to protect the privacy of Americans leading
twenty-first century lives. Congressional legislators introduced two bills in
2012 that, if passed, would have regulated the disclosure of cellular location
information.121 The first did not address the problems associated with
government tracking and therefore would not have protected citizens’
Fourth Amendment rights.122 The second, which legislators reintroduced in
2013,123 does address cellular location data privacy problems and is a
terrific improvement over the status quo,124 although it could be
strengthened with additional provisions to ensure greater law-enforcement
accountability.
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The first bill was the “Location Privacy Protection Act of 2012,”
sponsored by Senator Al Franken (D-MN).125 Unless an exception applied,
the Location Privacy Protection Act would not have allowed certain entities,
including service providers,126 to “knowingly collect, receive, record,
obtain, or disclose to a nongovernmental individual or entity the geolocation
information from an electronic communications device without the express
authorization of the individual that is using the electronic communications
device.”127 The term “electronic communications device” would have
almost certainly included cell phones,128 and “geolocation information”
would have included cell-site, GPS, and WiFi data.129 However, the
legislation would not have prevented warrantless government searches of
that information.130 The central provision of the Location Privacy
Protection Act would have only regulated disclosure to nongovernmental
individuals and entities.131 Furthermore, the legislation included an explicit
exception for providers disclosing customer geolocation information in
response to a request from any “law enforcement or intelligence agency of
the United States, a State, or a political subdivision of a State” with no
warrant requirement.132 The legislation, which would have created an
private right of action for violations,133 appeared to be primarily designed as
a consumer-protection law and not as a solution to any Fourth Amendment
problems.134
The other act under consideration by Congress, the “Geolocation
Privacy and Surveillance Act” (GPS Act), is far superior because it directly
addresses government searches.135 The original GPS Act died in committee
in 2012,136 but on March 21, 2013, Representative Jason Chaffetz (R-UT)
reintroduced it in the House, and Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) reintroduced
a companion bill in the Senate.137 The principal provision of the Act echoes
125
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the language of 18 U.S.C. § 2510 in ECPA, and, except as otherwise
specified, prohibits the actual or attempted intentional interception,
disclosure, or use of a person’s geolocation information.138 “Geolocation
information” for purposes of the GPS Act means “any information that is
not the content of a communication, concerning the location of a wireless
communication device or tracking . . . device that, in whole or in part, is
generated by or derived from the operation of that device” and can be used
to determine the location of the device’s user.139 This broad statement
would cover both historical and prospective cellular location data.140 The
GPS Act, therefore, would provide significant privacy protection for cellphone users.
Rep. Chaffetz testified at a subcommittee hearing that he introduced
the GPS Act because “the government and law enforcement should not be
able to track somebody indefinitely without their knowledge or consent or
without obtaining a probable cause warrant from a judge.”141 The
legislation, if passed, would require government entities to obtain a warrant
upon probable cause before they could ask a provider for a customer’s
geolocation information.142 Unlike ECPA, however, the GPS Act does not
detail the exact procedural requirements that law enforcement or
investigative officers must follow in order to obtain a warrant.143 Instead,
the warrant provision in the GPS Act refers to the general Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure regarding search and seizure.144 While certainly an
improvement over current state of the law, a more particularized warrant
provision embedded within the GPS Act would offer more robust privacy
protections. For example, the warrant provision could adopt the rule in
ECPA requiring officers applying for a warrant to state whether or not less
intrusive surveillance procedures have been tried or if such a procedure
would be impractical or too dangerous.145 Another protection that could be
borrowed from ECPA is the provision stipulating that officers must make a
“full and complete statement of the facts” regarding previous warrant
138
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applications concerning the “same persons, facilities or places.”146
Furthermore, a reporting requirement should be added so that the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts can publish statistics on
tracking. By including these provisions in the Act, legislators could ensure
that law-enforcement officials are held accountable for their surveillance
activities.
While the bill could use improvement, overall it is well crafted and
balanced. Tracking the language of ECPA almost exactly, the GPS Act
would prohibit the use of illicitly procured geolocation information as
evidence.147 And like the Location Privacy Protection Act, the GPS Act
would prohibit providers from disclosing consumer geolocation information
generally (due to profit motivations or otherwise).148 However, the GPS
Act would wisely insulate businesses that collect geolocation information in
the normal course of business from liability.149 It also includes other
common-sense exceptions for instances of consent,150 when the information
is already public,151 the interception of information during emergency
situations as when someone’s “life or safety . . . is threatened,”152 and when
the owner of a device authorizes a person acting under color of law to locate
someone who has unlawfully taken the device.153 Finally, just as in ECPA,
the legislation would allow for both criminal punishment and civil remedies
in case of a violation while also providing for certain “good faith” defenses
to such actions.154
Notably, the predecessor of the current bill enjoyed the support of
both the ACLU and from industry.155 Catherine Crump, an ACLU staff
attorney, testified at a congressional subcommittee hearing that the GPS Act
“would allow legitimate law enforcement investigations to proceed, while
ensuring that innocent Americans do not have their privacy intruded
146
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upon.”156 Without a law requiring judicial oversight of police tracking, she
opined, “[i]nnocent Americans can never be confident that they are free
from round-the-clock surveillance by law enforcement of their activities.”157
Just as important, telecommunications corporations and Internet companies
also support a warrant requirement.158 Edward J. Black, president and CEO
of the Computer & Communications Industry Association, spoke at the
same hearing to emphasize that businesses in the technology sector want
clarifying legislation in order to alleviate consumer concerns about the
vulnerability of their geolocation information.159 On behalf of his
organization’s member companies, which employ over half a million
workers in the United States,160 Black endorsed the legislation.161 The GPS
Act’s popularity with both civil libertarians and industry insiders shows that
the legislation enjoys broad support and therefore should be enacted
promptly.

CONCLUSION
Obtaining a warrant is not an overly cumbersome task and is made
relatively simple with modern technology.162 In thirty-four states and the
District of Columbia, police can apply for a warrant remotely by telephone
or electronic means.163 This includes via e-mail, facsimile, or even text.164
In Utah, for example, one law enforcement officer calculated that he can
obtain an electronic warrant in about twenty minutes.165 With warrants so
easy to procure today, there is little reason why Congress should not pass a
bill mandating warrants for cell-phone tracking in non-emergency
situations. The simple act of engaging in a modern activities, like using cell
phones, should not force Americans to sacrifice their constitutionally
protected right to privacy. Adopting a comprehensive geolocation
information privacy statute like the GPS Act, even without the suggested
improvements mentioned above, would go a long way towards protecting

156

Statement of Crump, supra note 8, at 47.
Id. at 50.
158
Id. at 48.
159
Statement of Black, supra note 155, at 42–43.
160
Id. at 38.
161
Id. at 45–46.
162
Brief of the Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 18, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No.
10–1259).
163
Id.
164
Id. at 18–19.
165
Id. at 19.
157

218

STOPPING POLICE IN THEIR TRACKS

[Vol. 12

what Justice Louis Brandeis called “the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men”—“the right to be let alone.”166
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